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BABY-FACE KILLERS:
A CRY FOR UNIFORM TREATMENT
FOR YOUTHS WHO MURDER,
FROM TRIAL TO SENTENCING
Jennifer A. Chin*
Juvenile Justice is meted out at every level of government
in America, but their differing standards, procedures, and
alternatives make these juvenile justice systems a fragment-
ed hodge-podge of contradictory programs . ... Under
these circumstances, it is ... [not] surprising ... that
juvenile justice is as bad as it is.'
INTRODUCTION
Bodies lay motionless.2 Victims were left bleeding and dazed.3
The public was outraged and astounded.4 The cause of all this: a
child. This is not a scene from a movie. It is the recurring theme
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A., Binghamton University, 1997.
The author wishes to thank her parents and her two brothers for their constant
support, love, encouragement and dedication; Hayman, Debbie, Justin and
Samantha for their love and support. The author also wishes to express a special
thanks to Steven for his constant love, generosity and support.
' CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN & MARSHALL S. GORDON HI, JUVENILE JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 403 (1979) (writing on the history and the pros and cons of the
juvenile system).
2 See Rick Bragg, 5 are Killed at School; Boys, 11 and 13, are Held, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al (reporting on the murder of a teacher and four
students in a schoolyard by two boys, ages 11 and 13, with guns).
3 Id.
4 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Bloodshed in a Schoolyard: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at Al (reporting on the health and condition of the two
boys in the juvenile detention center and the public's reaction to the limited
punishment being sought).
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of recent news stories addressing the numerous accounts of
murders committed by children.'
America's legal system treats juveniles differently than adults
by creating a segregated judicial system to adjudicate juvenile
criminal offenses.6 Juveniles are generally defined as persons who
have not reached the majority age of eighteen.' Because children
are believed to be less culpable 8 and to be capable of changing for
the better,9 the national and state governments deal with delinquent
' Id. See also Timothy Egan, Shootings in a Schoolhouse: The Overview,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at Al (describing the killing of four people when a
15 year-old student fired 51 shots into the cafeteria of his school).
6 See Rick Bragg, Bloodshed in a Schoolyard: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Bloodshed] (supporting the proposition of a
segregated system by reporting that the two young boys, because they both were
under the ages of 14, were not going to be tried in a criminal court).
7 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994). The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
defines a juvenile as an individual who has not reached the age of 18. Id. Black's
Law Dictionary defines a juvenile as "[a] young person who has not yet attained
the age at which he or she should be treated as an adult for purposes of criminal
law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (6th ed. 1995). The age of adulthood
varies by state. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (enumerating the
minimum ages, ranging from no set age limitation to the age of 16, required in
order for a case to be transferred to the criminal courts).
8 See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis
of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 371, 373 (1998) (advocating the need for rehabilitative treatment of
children and emphasizing that the transfer of these juvenile delinquents to adult
criminal courts does not achieve that goal). See also Eric J. Fritsch & Craig
Hemmens, Juvenile Justice and the Criminal Law: An Assessment of Legislative
Approaches to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas
1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 566 (1996) (discussing the common law
position on the culpability of children).
At common law there was an irrebuttable presumption, known as the
"infancy defense," that children under the age of seven were incapable
of forming felonious intent. Children between the ages of seven and
fourteen were presumed similarly incapable, but this presumption was
rebuttable. Children over the age of fourteen were presumed to be fully
responsible for their actions.
Id. (citations omitted).
9 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 566 (stating that "[p]roponents
of a separate juvenile justice system believed that juveniles lacked the maturity
and level of culpability that traditional criminal sanctions presupposed, and that
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children through rehabilitation rather than punishment.' ° Congress
implemented this policy by enacting the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act ("JDA")" for federal prosecution of juveniles. 12 The
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted their own
statutes for state juvenile proceedings. 3
The JDA and individual state statutes all emphasize that a
separate, independent system should be implemented to address the
different needs of children.' 4 However, at a time when the nation
juvenile offenders should therefore not only be treated as less blameworthy but
also as more amenable to treatment and rehabilitation than hardened adult
criminals."). See also Gerard F. Glynn, Arkansas' Missed Opportunity for
Rehabilitation: Sending Children to Adult Courts, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J.
77, 80-82 (1997) (asserting the early reformers' principle that children are
essentially good and are amenable to proper societal behavior changes).
'0 See Glynn, supra note 9, at 80-81 (stating that "[a]ll fifty states, the
District of Columbia... and the federal government have juvenile court systems
which attempt to balance the need for rehabilitation with the rights of the
children and their families"). Congress proposed that juvenile institutions should
allow for frequent visits from friends and relatives, unlimited letters to be
received, outside recreational activities and even trips to the movies or classes
for those in the open institutions. H.R. REP. No. 81-2979, at *4-*5 (1950),
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3983, 3983 (discussing the proposal for a system
of rehabilitation and treatment for juveniles to be implemented federally). The
bill discusses these measures based on institutions already in effect in California,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts and Texas. Id.
"1 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1996). The term "JDA" refers to the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act of 1938 and not the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974.
12 See Abraham Abramovsky, Federal Prosecution of Juveniles, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 29, 1998, at 3 (discussing the evolution of the JDA and whether New York
prosecutors should seek the assistance of federal law in juvenile prosecutions).
13 See Adam D. Kamenstein, Note, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice:
The Case for Consistency and Legality, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 2105, 2109 (1997)
(discussing the enactment of state statutes dealing with juvenile justice). All 50
states, by the early 1940's, implemented their own juvenile legal systems. Id.
14 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence:
A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138 (1997) (suggesting that juvenile justice policies should
concentrate on the development of delinquent behavior and not on the offense).
Juvenile justice should emphasize rehabilitating the youths to function normally
in society. Id. at 140.
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is calling for harsher punishment for severe crimes committed by
its children, it is evident that a change is needed in the statutory
scheme. "5
This Note proposes that the federal and state governments
amend their juvenile delinquency statutes to include a special
provision for children twelve years of age and older to be treated
as adults, from trial to punishment, in murder cases. Amending the
JDA to include a provision that automatically transfers these
murder cases to the adult court system would serve as a catalyst for
a nationwide revision advocating harsher treatment toward juvenile
killers as it did when the JDA first was enacted in 1938 and when
the JDA was amended in 1974 and 1984.6 This Note does not
suggest that juvenile delinquency statutes should be eliminated, nor
does it propose to transfer all the juvenile crimes to criminal court.
Rather, because of the violent and calculating nature of murder,
and because murder is the only crime where the harm-doer
intentionally sets out to take away another's life, this Note asserts
that the statutes should be amended to reflect the harshness and
severity of the particular crime of murder. Part I of this Note
describes the JDA and state juvenile statutes generally, with an
Thus, policies that focus solely on the harm caused by youthful
offenders may not be the optimal means to achieve the instrumentalist
goals of their proponents. These policies fail to calculate the long-term
social costs of categorical punishment, particularly the costs incurred
by diminishing the prospects for productive adulthood of those
offenders whose delinquent behavior reflects transient developmental
influences.
Id. at 139.
'" See Klein, supra note 8, at 374 (stating that the "shift in focus [from
rehabilitation to punishment] is largely due to a popular view of a juvenile
system that coddles the young offender"). See, e.g., Fritsch & Hemmens, supra
note 8, at 564 (writing on the different legislative proposals to make young
criminals criminally liable for their crimes). The Texas legislature responded to
the public concerns over the increase in crime rates of children in the state.
Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 564. Homicides caused by Texan children
increased 171.5% in seven years (1985-1992). Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note
8, at 564.
16 All the states followed suit after the implementation of the JDA. See infra




emphasis on their roots, historical purposes, and current impact on
children and society. Part II begins by asserting that there is a need
for adult trial proceedings for juvenile murderers ages twelve and
over because they are psychologically capable of understanding the
extent of their actions, thereby making them morally blameworthy
in the legal arena. Part II also discusses the discrepancies in
treatment among the states arising from the different state laws
regarding juvenile adjudication procedures. Part III suggests the
need for harsher punishment for juvenile murderers because
rehabilitative measures have proven to be ineffective and laws
guided by deterrence too lenient to prevent future commissions of
the crime. Finally, this Note concludes with the necessity for
uniform treatment of juvenile murderers, in both the federal and
state judicial systems, to prevent procedural and sentencing
inconsistencies and to emphasize the severity of the crime.
I. THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND GENERAL STATE
STATUTORY SCHEMES
Treating children and adults as distinct individuals was not
always the policy of the United States.' 7 At America's beginning,
children, treated as small adults, were given the same treatment as
their adult counterparts, especially when it came to legal sanc-
tions. 18 A child who committed a crime was processed, prosecuted
and punished under the same system as adults who committed a
similar crime.' 9
'7 See Klein, supra note 8, at 375 (discussing that, although special treatment
of children was available, the states, for the most part, did not institute these
procedures).
8 See Glynn, supra note 9, at 79 (stating that even with the infancy defense,
children were still adjudicated and punished as adults); Scott & Grisso, supra
note 14, at 141-43 (reasoning that the reformation to implement a separate
juvenile legal system was due to society's harsh treatment of child offenders as
adults).
19 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2109 (discussing the historical
treatment of child offenders).
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It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that people
began to change their views on the criminality of children. 2' A
progressive reformation arose aimed at changing the national policy
of punishing delinquent children to rehabilitating them into better
persons.2' This reform movement was responsible for the nature
of juvenile statutes in effect today.22
A. History
In 1899, Illinois enacted the Juvenile Court Act to provide
courts with discretion in lessening criminal liability for juve-
niles.23 The Illinois Act was the first statute to transfer juvenile
criminals to a separate court, recognizing the differences between
juveniles and adults.24 Prior to 1899, "jurisdiction over juvenile
20 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2110 (explaining that criminality was
a result of societal factors surrounding the children). See also Klein, supra note
8, at 375 ("[I]t was not until the close of the nineteenth century that an attempt
was made to organize different reforms aimed at juvenile offenders into a
coherent system of criminal justice.").
21 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 14, at 142-43 (noting that as the new
science of psychology came into being, a new perspective on child behavior
arose which led to the decriminalization of children).
22 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2109 (indicating that the early and
contemporary juvenile statutes are a result of the reformation to create a separate
juvenile legal system).
23 Glynn, supra note 9, at 79-80. See also SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1980) (summarizing the history of the JDA and the
reasons for its creation).
24 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2109 ("The Illinois Juvenile Court Act
of 1899 was the first time in American history that an entirely separate and
independent court system was created solely for the adjudication of juveniles.").
Although Illinois was the first to formally implement and establish a juvenile
court, the origins of juvenile corrections can be traced as far back as 1825.
VICTOR L. STREIB, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 5 (1978).
[The New York House of Refuge] was established to meet the same
kinds of needs the ... [Juvenile Justice System] of the 1970s trie[d]
to meet, including avoidance of harsh criminal penalties for unfortunate
children, segregating "predelinquent" children from hardened delin-
quents, providing "proper" moral, ethical, political, and social values
and role models for deprived children, and treating such children as
victims rather than offenders.
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offenders was maintained by the very same courts in which an
adult would be tried., 25 By 1923, all but two states had imple-
mented juvenile justice provisions in their criminal laws. 6 In
1938, Congress enacted the JDA,27 which vested the courts with
discretion to transfer a case involving a juvenile to a juvenile
Id. at 5-6.
Illinois began its movement towards juvenile reformation in 1855 when it
established the Chicago Reform School as an alternative institution to prisons.
Id. at 6. "In fact, the reform movement in Illinois leading to the 1899 establish-
ment of the first official juvenile court was characterized partly by a desire to
avoid prisons for children by establishing a special juvenile court which could
not send children to prison." Id. (citations omitted).
25 Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2109 (citing Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1194 (1970)).
26 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2109 (citing H. Warren Dunham, The
Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in Processing Offenders, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 508, 509 (1958)) (illustrating that Connecticut and Wyoming
were the only two states that did not follow in Illinois's footsteps in creating a
separate system to handle juvenile delinquents).
27 See Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the early views of child
punishment and the national reforms to institute a legal system that was focused
on helping children function in society rather than putting them in prison). The
Act allowed prosecutors discretion to prosecute under the juvenile system "except
in cases where the defendant faced the death penalty or life imprisonment."
Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3. See also D. Ross Martin, Note, Conspiratorial
Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and Federal
Conspiracy Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 859, 860 (1994) (describing the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act ("JDA") of 1938 and what it meant to juvenile
defendants). The JDA had been changed in 1974 and 1984 to condition the
transfer to criminal courts. See Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the
creation and evolution of the JDA). The JDA of 1974 provided that "[r]ather
than beginning with the presumption that minor defendants should be tried as
adults unless juvenile procedure was requested by the prosecutor, the . . . Act
mandated that all such defendants be tried as juveniles unless judicial approval
for adult trial was obtained." Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3. The 1984 JDA
allowed for automatic transfers of juveniles to the adult courts for certain
offenses and it also "expanded the jurisdiction of federal authorities to prosecute
juveniles in cases where state courts had parallel jurisdiction." Abramovsky,
supra note 12, at 3. Currently, the JDA allows judicial discretion to transfer
juveniles to a criminal court instead of being prosecuted in the juvenile system.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1996).
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court.28 By the mid-1940's, all states had established independent
court systems for juveniles.29
Legislators implemented these new state juvenile reform
statutes and the JDA under the belief that juveniles were less
blameworthy and less morally culpable for their actions than
adults.3° Proponents of these statutes believed that the actions
28 See Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3 (indicating that the 1938 JDA was
created under the model of the Illinois Act, the first juvenile statute created in
the country). "The [] JDA granted federal prosecutors unfettered discretion to
offer juvenile prosecution to any defendant under the age of eighteen, except in
cases in which the offense charged was punishable by death or life imprison-
ment." Martin, supra note 27, at 860.
29 See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations
in Processing Offenders, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 508, 509 (1958) (describ-
ing the history and procedure of the juvenile legal system on both national and
state levels). These juvenile systems embraced five pivotal philosophical
elements:
1. The superior rights of the state over the rights of the child and his
parents;
2. Individualized justice for each child;
3. The juvenile status of delinquency at somewhat different from and
less serious than the adult status of criminal;
4. Informal, noncriminal procedure instead of legalistic, criminal
procedure; and
5. A remedial, preventive, correctional purpose rather than a punitive
threatening purpose.
STREIB, supra note 24, at 8.
30 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111 (discussing the early reform
movements that led to the implementation of legislation conceming juvenile
delinquents). See also Klein, supra note 8, at 373 (briefly describing the
historical view of children and punishment).
The Juvenile Act created a statutory enclave for juveniles accused of
criminal misconduct. Among other things, the Act shields juveniles
from the ordinary criminal justice system and gives them protective
treatment not available to adults accused of the same crimes. A
successful prosecution under the Act, for example, results in a civil
adjudication of status, not a criminal conviction. In addition, juveniles
adjudged delinquent under the Act often receive far more lenient
treatment than their adult counterparts.
United States v. John Doe, 53 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). Moreover, "Uluvenile Court proceedings were viewed as civil ....
rather than criminal[,]. . . children were not found guilty, but determined in need
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children took were a consequence of scientific and sociological
factors.3' It was these factors that forced juveniles to commit
crimes.32 Further, "a child criminal was a criminal only because
he lacked the necessary moral and educational structure and
instruction that a healthy non-criminal child received. 33 Accord-
ingly, children were deemed less responsible for their actions in the
eyes of the law. Advocates of the new statutes believed that a
parens patriae34 approach would be most beneficial in the
reformation of juveniles.35 Under this approach, an emphasis in
treatment and supervision was invoked instead of penalization.36
Parens patriae aimed to "alleviate [the] social ills"' 37 that caused
children to commit crimes.38 It was widely believed that institu-
tions that cared for and nurtured young individuals were better
suited to transform the delinquents into respectable, law-abiding
of the court's help[, the] juvenile.., was referred to as a 'delinquent' and not
a 'criminal' . . . [and] the system was paternalistic and nonadversarial." Charles
J. Aron & Michelle S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads, 22-JUNE
CHAMPION 10, 12 n.10 (1998) (describing the differences between judicial,
statutory and automatic waivers and the positives and negatives of each).
31 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2110 (listing some factors as lack of
education and immigration, believing that immigrants were unable to provide
education and other benefits for their children because of poverty, lack of
English and unfamiliarity of the new culture).
32 Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2110.
" Dunham, supra note 29, at 510 (stating the sociological reasons for
delinquent behavior according to the Progressives).
3 Parens patriae "refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles . ... It is the
principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
" See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 70
(1997) (proposing to eliminate the juvenile system altogether and incorporate a
youth discount in the criminal system to account for the age of the young
criminal).
36 Id.
3' Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 691, 693 (1991) [hereinafter Transformation] (discussing the parens patriae
model, although he believes that the juvenile criminal system is not the best
means to adjudicate young criminals).
38 id.
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citizens.3 9 The state would assume the role of the parents, who
had failed in the child's upbringing, by giving the child a nurturing
home and a role model.40 Parens patriae was believed to be more
effective in transforming the juvenile delinquent rather than
ordering the juvenile into a prison cell surrounded by hardened
criminals.41 In accordance with the belief that nurturing the
juvenile would eliminate delinquent behavior, the government
undertook more lenient disciplinary measures for juveniles.42
Therefore, if the individual proved capable of changing for the
better, the system would aid in this development rather than focus
on punishment.43
39 Aron & Hurley, supra note 30, at 12 ("[t]he thought was that by focusing
primarily on rehabilitative treatment in a non-adversarial, decriminalized process,
juvenile offenders would be protected, cared for and educated.").
4o See Glynn, supra note 9, at 93 (stating that, "if such [a] child cannot be
properly cared for and corrected in his own home ... , then ... [the child] may
be placed in a suitable institution where it may be helped[,] ... educated and
equipped for industrial efficiency and useful citizenship"); Kamenstein, supra
note 13, at 2112 (describing that the child would be removed from parental
custody if it was found to be unsuitable to the child's health and well-being and
instead the child would be placed into a more suitable environment).
41 See Glynn, supra note 9, at 79-80 (explaining the reformers' philosophy
of how children should be treated in the eyes of the law and the appropriate
punishment for them).
42 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2112 (referring to the psychological
approach of nurturing to juvenile reformation). See supra note 29 and accompa-
nying text (discussing how the juvenile proceedings differ from criminal
proceedings).
43 See Glynn, supra note 9, at 80 (stating that the early reformers saw
children as "essentially good"). Because children were viewed as being
"essentially good," it was envisioned that the procedural process would be one
where the judge speaks to the child about the acts committed and the concerns
attached, and then discuss the case with sociologists and other professionals
before determining what course of action to take. Kamenstein, supra note 13, at
2114. This would enable the court to determine whether the child would benefit
from rehabilitation due to the child's capability to conform to society's standards.




The new reformed approaches to juvenile delinquency treatment
were aimed at minimizing the punishment that a child would incur
for a crime." It was thought that the criminal system was too
harsh for a minor; the prison system threatened children rather than
helped them.45 Therefore, a separate juvenile system that empha-
sized rehabilitation rather than acclimating these delinquents to
adhere to the adult penal system would be more beneficial to the
child and society.46 Moreover, a caring and gentle environment
would be more conducive to behavioral changes. 47 The proceed-
ings under the juvenile statutes were less adversarial and technical-
ly civil, not criminal. 48 For example, "attorneys for the govern-
ment did not charge a child, but filed a petition; children were not
defendants, but respondents; children were not found guilty, but
adjudicated delinquent; children were not sentenced, but commit-
ted.' ,49 Moreover, the permissible duration that the juvenile could
have been held in a juvenile institution was usually limited
44 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 566 (explaining why the
juvenile courts were implemented to spare juveniles from the criminal courts).
The state and federal juvenile systems were proposed to serve the purpose of
protecting and rehabilitating the nation's children. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra
note 8, at 567.
41 See Glynn, supra note 9, at 79 ("The early reformers were appalled by
adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long
prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals.").
46 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2110-11 (indicating that the welfare of
the child was more important than balancing rights and wrongs). The reformers
believed that "a child criminal was a criminal only because he lacked the
necessary moral and educational structure and instruction that a healthy non-
criminal child received." Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111. It was their belief
that by rehabilitating the child, he could be cured "of the ill[s] of criminality cast
upon him by circumstance." Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111.
4" See Glynn, supra note 9, at 79-80 (discussing the change in views on how
a juvenile delinquent should be treated in order to mold the child to function in
society properly).
48 See Klein, supra note 8, at 376-77 (describing the rehabilitative system
and its implications on children compared to a criminal system).
4' Klein, supra note 8, at 377.
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according to his or her age, regardless of the crime committed.5 °
Governments developed a separate and distinct system for adjudi-
cating juveniles in an effort to make them feel less like crimi-
nals.5 These systems assumed that the juveniles were not crimi-
nally responsible for their actions and, therefore, could not be
punished like their adult counterparts.52
C. Today's Juvenile System
In recent years, the juvenile system has been revised to
encompass the traditional, pre-reformation view of juvenile
50 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b)(1)(A) (1984) (stating a juvenile can only
be held until he attains the age of 21); In re Juvenile Delinquency Action No.
JV95000239, 921 P.2d 34, 36 (Ariz. 1996) (holding that in Arizona, a juvenile
may be detained until he attains the age of 18).
51 See STREIB, supra note 24, at 5-6 (explaining that the federal and all state
governments eventually adopted some kind of juvenile justice system which
focused less on the criminality of the juvenile's conduct and concentrated more
on helping the child eliminate the social ills that caused the delinquency).
52 See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 825
(1988) [hereinafter Juvenile Court] (discussing that the reformers implemented
juvenile justice systems to take into account that children behave delinquently
because of their social surroundings and are not really at fault, therefore, they
cannot be held responsible as if they were).
The system proffered by the Progressives left judges, assisted by social
workers, to investigate the problematic child's background, identify the
sources of the misconduct at issue, and develop a treatment plan to
meet the child's needs. Juvenile court personnel enjoyed enormous
discretion to make dispositions in the "best interests of the child."
Principles of psychology and social work, rather than formal rules,
guided decision makers. The court collected as much information as
possible about the child-his life history, character, social environment,
and individual circumstances-on the assumption that a scientific
analysis of the child's past would reveal the proper diagnosis and cure.
The overall inquiry accorded minor significance to the offense
committed by the child, as it indicated little about the child's "real
needs." At hearings and dispositions, the court directed its attention
first and foremost to the child's character and lifestyle.
Id. at 825.
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delinquents.53 States have revised their juvenile statutes to allow
a margin of flexibility for adult treatment of children. 4 Today, in
all states, transfers to criminal courts for certain types of crimes are
permitted for minors.55 The decision is usually within the discre-
tion of the courts.56 Some states have not set limitations on the
minimum age that a transfer can occur.57 Others have set a
" See Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing that currently, the JDA
and some state statutes require automatic transfers of children to criminal courts
unless a request for juvenile adjudication is made). See Fritsch & Hemmens,
supra note 8, at 564 (stating that the increasing trend toward juvenile offenders
is to treat them like their adult counterparts). The traditional view has been to
treat young criminals with the same respect as adults. See Abramovsky, supra
note 12, at 3 (indicating that historically children and adults were viewed
indifferently). Prior to Illinois's revolutionary change-over in 1899, children were
subjected to criminal courts and penalized to the same extent as non-juveniles
who were convicted of the same crime. See Glynn, supra note 9, at 79 (stating
that the Illinois legislature was the first to establish a juvenile court because of
the fact that children and adults were fundamentally different).
" See, e.g., infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (referring to the ages,
crimes and factors that permit transfers to adult courts).
5 See infra note 56 and accompanying text (referring to the types of crimes,
depending on age, permitted to be transferred to a criminal court).
56 Unless there is a provision for automatic transfer, a waiver to criminal
court is usually based upon the child's age and offense committed. See generally
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (ordering to criminal
court children 14 and older for capital murder, first or second degree murder,
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, assault, rape, first degree battery or possession
of a handgun on school property; 16 and older with any felony offense); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1991 & Supp. 1999) (ordering to criminal court
children 14 and older for any violent felony, 16 and older with any other
offense). Some states specify other factors as well (i.e. child's home life, past
offenses). See, e.g., State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. 1998) (basing the
transfer on seriousness of the offense, community's need for protection against
the minor, history); Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308, 1311 n.4 (Pa.
1992) (considering whether treatment would help, the interests of the community
and whether there is mental illness).
" Transfers depend on the crime committed and the discretion of the court
rather than the age of the juvenile. Courts take into consideration factors such as:
the maturity and sophistication of the child; seriousness of the offense; violent,
aggressive, premeditative or willful manner of the act committed; whether the
crime is against a person or property; prior records and contacts; and public
protection. These factors are evident in ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100 (Michie
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distinct standard of how old one must be to be adjudicated by the
criminal courts.58 In these states, regardless of how horrendous or
1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-817 (1998 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-276 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (1994 & Supp. 1998);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.349
(1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (1994 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-11-4 (Michie 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (Michie 1994 & Supp.
1999).
18 ALA. CODE. § 12-15-34 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (14 years of age); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22 (West 1998) (15 years of age; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 707.01 (West 1998) (16 years of age); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518
(West 1999) (12 years of age); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127 (West 1995
& Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010 (1998) (16
years of age); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (1997) (15 years of age); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.226 (West 1998) (14 years of age unless voluntarily asks to be tried
as an adult); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-39 (1999) (13 years of age); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 571-22 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998) (14 years of age); IDAHO CODE
§ 20-508 (1999) (14 years of age); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (West
1998) (13 years of age); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-1-4 (West 1998) (16 years of
age); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45 (West 1997) (14 years of age); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1636 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (14 years of age); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 635.020, 640.010 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998) (14 years of age); LA. CODE
Juv. PROC. ANN. art. 857 (West 1998) (14 years of age); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
119, § 74 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.125 (West 1998) (14 years of age); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (1999)
(13 years of age); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (12
years of age); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (1999) (12 years of age); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.080 (Michie 1996) (14 years of age); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-2-3 (Michie 1999) (14 years of age); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00
(McKinney 1998) (13 years of age); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1995) (13 years
of age); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1999) (14 years
of age); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (14 years
of age); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999) (14 years
of age); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605 (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 1999) (14
years of age); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (16 years of
age); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of
age); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-601 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (16 years of age); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (10 years of age); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Michie 1999) (14 years of age); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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heinous the crime, if the individual has not attained the minimum
age required by statute, he must remain in the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts.
For juveniles adjudicated in a federal court, the JDA currently
requires that the following factors be considered:
[T]he age and social background of the juvenile; the nature
of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juve-
nile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the
nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response
to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed
to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.59
This provision allows the courts too much leeway in the determina-
tion of whether the charged juvenile should be treated as an adult
or child, and results in the disparate treatment of juveniles who
commit similar crimes. 60 Therefore, Congress should implement
automatic waivers in the JDA, instead of a judicial waiver, to
effectively eliminate the weighing of factors which lead to the
disparate treatment of same crime offenders.
II. ADULT TRIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE NECESSARY FOR
JUVENILES WHO COMMIT MURDER
Children without mental defects ages twelve and older possess
the mental capacity to comprehend that the act of murder is
morally wrong and have the physical ability to refrain from the
wrongful conduct of murder.61 Thus, juveniles who commit
§ 13.40.110 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (15 years of age); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-
10 (1999) (14 years of age); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.18 (West 1998) (14 years
of age).
-9 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1996).
60 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2115 (citing Juvenile Court, supra note
52, at 822) ("This rehabilitative latitude resulted in great inequities of disposition
between county lines .... It was quite possible for two youths of the same age
to commit the same crime... in different jurisdictions [and get different punish-
ments].").
61 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 310, 317 (2d ed.
1995) (explaining that in the legal forum, mental abnormalities and insanity are
defenses to criminal liability because persons inflicted with such problems do not
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murder are morally culpable and, therefore, should be subject to the
criminal courts.62 But, juveniles who should be held criminally
responsible are not always subjected to the criminal system because
courts have too much discretion in determining whether to try the
child in a criminal court or adjudicate the child under juvenile
proceedings.63 To cure this disparate treatment, statutes should
impose an automatic waiver, sending juvenile murderers straight to
criminal court.64
The recent schoolhouse shootings illustrate the need to amend
the current statutes to encompass tougher sanctions. One such event
occurred in Jonesboro, Arkansas, on March 25, 1998.65 Mitchell
Johnson and Andrew Golden, ages thirteen and eleven, respective-
ly, took aim at their fellow peers at Westside Middle School at
12:45 p.m. 66 The two boys stole semiautomatic rifles and other
have the capacity to appreciate the crime). A person who is incompetent may not
be prosecuted in a court of law due to a lack of understanding of the proceedings
against her. Id. at 310. "Incompetency may be the result of a physical handicap
(e.g., an inability to speak) or temporary or permanent mental disability (e.g.,
mental illness, mental retardation, or amnesia)." Id.
Insanity is a legal term as well as a defense that excuses the defendant from
criminal liability if it can be shown that the defendant was insane at the time of
the crime. Id. at 317. Whereas, the terms "mental illness," "mental disease or
defect," and "mental disorder" are not legal terms and are not excusable defenses
unless a person suffering these mental dysfunctions can prove insanity. Id. If
insanity cannot be proven, the defense of diminished capacity, recognized only
in a few states and only for the crime of murder, provides that "a person who
does not meet the state's definition of insanity, but who suffers from a mental
abnormality, is less blameworthy, and therefore less deserving of punishment,
than a killer who acts with a normal state of mind." Id. at 335, 341. See infra
Part II.A, discussing the blameworthiness of juveniles 12 years of age and older.
62 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 103 (explaining that our legal system
only holds one criminally responsible when one can understand rationally that the
actions were morally wrong).
63 See infra Part II.B, discussing the discrepancies across state lines
regarding adjudication of juveniles due to the discretion given to the courts.
64 See infra Part II.C, explaining that an automatic waiver system would
promote consistency and fairness in the adjudication of juvenile offenders.
65 Verhovek, supra note 4, at Al.
66 Bragg, supra note 2, at Al.
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firearms from the grandfather of one of the boys67 and a van from
the parents of the other boy.68 They parked the van close to the
school and wandered onto their school grounds dressed in camou-
flage.69 As the older boy waited in the grassy area across from the
entrance to the school taking cover behind the trees, the younger
boy ran into the school and pulled the fire alarm. 70 As the stu-
dents, ranging from eleven to thirteen years of age, filed out, the
boys took aim and fired twenty-seven rounds into the crowd,
resulting in five deaths (four girls and one teacher) and the
wounding of ten students.7'
In just the last four years, there have been a total of six mass
killings by juveniles.72 The last of these killings occurred in
67 John Kifner, From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a
Schoolyard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, § 1, at 1 (describing the events of the
day when Mitchell Johnson and Andrew Golden shot and killed four of their
classmates and a teacher). The weapons came from the house of Andrew
Golden's grandfather. Id. Apparently, the two boys snuck into Andrew's
grandparents' house and took the guns without the knowledge of his grandpar-
ents. Id.
68 Id. The two boys stole Mitchell's parents' 1991 Dodge van and packed
it with sleeping bags, gear and guns. Id.
69 See Bloodshed, supra note 6, at Al (describing the incident that occurred
in Jonesboro, Arkansas). See also Sam Howe Verhovek, Bloodshed in a
Schoolyard: The Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at Al [hereinafter
Suspects] (profiling the two boys and describing the course they took the day
they killed five people).
70 See Bragg, supra note 2, at Al (reporting on the shooting in Jonesboro,
from the preparations taken by the boys to the deaths that incurred).
71 See Bragg, supra note 2, at Al (reporting on the events of the day);
Verhovek, supra note 4, at Al (reporting the casualties from the shooting). See
also David W. Chen, Bloodshed in a Schoolyard: The Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1998, at A22 (profiling the lives of the victims of the Jonesboro killings).
72 See Bragg, supra note 2, at Al (supporting the proposition by delineating
occurrences of mass killings by those under the age of 18); James Brooke,
Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in Colorado School Said to Gun
Down as Many as 23 and Kill Themselves, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al
(reporting on the nation's deadliest school shooting that occurred in Littleton,
Colorado, by two teenage boys attending the high school); Death in a Middle
School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at A26 [hereinafter Middle School]
(describing the events of the Jonesboro incident and indicating that this was not
the first occurrence of children killing numerous persons); Timothy Egan, Where
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Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999, when two seventeen-year-
old boys, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, entered their school,
Columbine High School, and took it hostage by gunpoint for five
hours.73 The result was fifteen deaths (Harris, Klebold, thirteen
students and one teacher) and twenty-three wounded.74 Juvenile
killings are also occurring outside of the school environment.
Rampages Begin: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at §1, 1
[hereinafter Rampages] (summarizing the recent mass killings by children no
older than 16 years of age). Bragg reports that in Paducah, Kentucky, Michael
Carneal, 14, shot three classmates to death and wounded five when he opened
fire on a prayer group on December 1, 1997 and in Pearl, Mississippi, Luke T.
Woodham, 16, stabbed his mother to death, killed his ex-girlfriend and another
female and wounded seven others on October 1, 1997. Bragg, supra note 2, at
Al. Egan reports on three additional incidents: 1) Moses Lake, Washington,
February 2, 1996, Barry Loukaitis, 14, killed three and wounded one as he fired
on his high school algebra class; 2) Bethal, Alaska, February 19, 1997, Evan
Ramsey, 16, killed two in his high school; 3) Springfield, Illinois, May 21, 1998,
Kipland Kinkel, 15, killed four and injured 22 in his high school cafeteria as well
as killed his parents before opening fire on his classmates. Rampages, supra, at
§ 1, 1. The last of these massacres occurred in Littleton, Colorado, at Columbine
High School, where Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold took their school hostage,
killing 15 and injured 23. Brooke, supra, at Al.
Mass killings are not the only problem anymore. Since the Columbine
incident, America has seen numerous accounts of juveniles conspiring or
attempting to mass murder their fellow schoolmates. See, e.g., Randal Archibold,
Boys Won't Be Prosecuted in Threat to Bomb School, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999,
at B3 (reporting on the arrest of five students attending a New York City public
high school for conspiracy to bomb their school); James Brooke, Terror in
Littleton: The Details; Attack at School Planned a Year, Authorities Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Details] (stating that in Texas, five
junior high school students were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder, arson
and manufacture explosives). In Georgia, one juvenile actually tried copying
Klebold and Harris. Kevin Sack, Guns and School: The Overview; Youth With
2 Guns Shoots 6 at Georgia School, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at Al (reporting
on the Georgia shooting). He decided to take out his anger by shooting six
people in his high school before breaking down and surrendering to his assistant
principal. Id.
71 See Brooke, supra note 72, at Al (describing the Columbine shooting).
74 See Details, supra note 72, at Al (indicating that the killings were planned
in advance and the boys intended to destroy the school and as many people as
they could, including themselves).
JUVENILE MURDERERS
Today's youths are also committing single acts of murder.75 To
diminish the occurrences of these horrible crimes of violence, the
imposition of tougher sanctions for juvenile murderers is neces-
sary.7
6
A. Juveniles are Morally Blameworthy for Their Crimes and
Should Be Tried in Criminal Court
Imposition of tougher sanctions for criminal conduct is only
permitted for those who are morally blameworthy and criminally
responsible for their actions.77 Accordingly, subjecting juveniles
to the criminal courts would be permitted by our legal system
75 See, e.g., State v. Kelsey, 502 S.E.2d 63, 57, 60 (S.C. 1998) (holding the
juvenile reachable by the criminal court because of the severity of his acts);
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Mass. 1996) (stating that the
15-year-old's horrific slaying of the elderly woman and his inability to be
rehabilitated places the juvenile within the jurisdiction of the criminal court). In
Kelsey, a 16-year-old boy strangled a girl to death, raped her, then placed a
homemade bomb into her mouth and lit the fuse. Kelsey, 502 S.E.2d at 57-58.
In Massachusetts, a 15-year-old juvenile stabbed a woman 66 times and slashed
her 31 times, leaving her to bleed to death. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d at 555.
76 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns over
how we as a nation should treat these juvenile killers). Today, there is more
emphasis placed on victims rather than on the fate of perpetrators. See William
Glaberson, Shootings in a Schoolhouse: The Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1998, at §1, 1 (reporting on the reactions of the nation to the recent teenage
murdering sprees). A Texas state legislator proposed to amend Texas law to
allow juveniles as young as 11-years-old to be subject to the death penalty for
murder. See id. The chief of the New York City juvenile prosecution unit
expressed that "the leniency of the juvenile justice system had failed to bring any
improvements." Id. House Representative Charles Canady emphasized that
juvenile murderers "cannot be simply dealt with by putting someone in a juvenile
detention home for a few years and then putting them back on the streets." Meet
the Press (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 29, 1998) (interview with five
members of the House Judiciary Committee (Robert Barr, Charles Canady, James
E. Rogan, Zoe Lofgren and Mel Watt) on how to deal with juveniles that commit
adult crimes).
77 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 101 (discussing that criminal responsibil-
ity and punishment are beneficial to society and, therefore, only permitted for
those who are knowledgeable about their actions and appreciative of the
consequences therefrom).
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because juveniles ages twelve and older possess the mental
capacity and physical ability to refrain from the unlawful con-
duct."8
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.79 Translated, "an act
does not make [a person] guilty, unless the mind be guilty. 80
Society imposes moral and legal expectations which everyone is
expected to adhere to.81 When a person is "unable rationally to
understand morally" what he is doing, he is unable to "grasp and
be guided by the good reason not to breach ... [the] moral and
legal expectation" society accepts. 82 It is only when a person
cannot rationally understand the actions he has just taken that he
is relieved of any criminal liability.83 For one to be rational,
normatively, one must have "the ability to act for good reasons"
and the ability not to act if doing so would be wrong.8 Put more
simply, persons are criminally responsible only when they can
rationally comprehend and recognize the consequences of their
actions.85 Therefore, criminal responsibility arises from cogni-
81tion.
So, when is a person cognizant? To answer this question, it is
first necessary to understand what cognition entails.
Cognition comprises the processes by which an individual
obtains knowledge of an object or of its environment. It
78 See infra Part II.A, discussing the moral blameworthiness of juveniles 12
years of age and older, making them criminally responsible for their actions, and
allowing tougher sanctions to be imposed on them.
79 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 101 (summarizing and defining the different
concepts of criminal law).
80 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 101.
81 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 101.
82 Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &




85 See id. (explaining that a person will not be held criminally liable only
when he is unable to rationally comprehend his actions).
86 See Method: Development of Logical Thinking (visited Nov. 17, 1999)




includes: perception, discovery, recognition, imagining,
judging, memorizing, learning, thinking, and frequently
speech. These processes develop through a series of stages
from birth onwards giving rise to a progressive increase in
the ability to construct and express fundamental physical
concepts ... and logical concepts. Mental growth may
therefore be defined as the progressive expansion of an
individual's ability to deal effectively with encountered
environmental situations.1
7
Accordingly, a person becomes cognitive when that person has the
intellectual capacity and ability to reason logically.88
It has been the belief that youngsters do not have the ability to
control their actions, even if they know it is morally wrong to act
in such a manner.89 It was therefore believed that they lacked
control over themselves and could not be held responsible for their
actions." But, scientific research in developmental psychology
tells a different story, that juveniles do have the capability of
exerting self-control, they just choose not to exercise it.91
Jean Piaget, a renowned psychologist in the field of child
psychology, identified a four-stage youth development process from
birth to adolescence: (1) the sensorimotor stage (birth to age two),
when development of motor controls and cognitive skills occurs;
(2) the preoperational stage (two to seven), when the child develops
verbal skills; (3) the concrete operational stage (seven to twelve),
when cognition of abstract concepts form; and (4) the formal
operational stage (twelve to adult), when the development of
logical and systematic reasoning occurs.92 The formal operational
87 id.
88 id.
89 Morse, supra note 82, at 23. "[C]hildren lack normative competence
because they are generally unable to grasp the good reasons not to breach an
expectation [to infringe on another's freedom]." Id.
90 See id. at 45-50 (explaining the public perception that "being out of
control" is synonymous with "lack of culpability").
" See id. at 53 (discussing the misconceptions concerning juvenile
rationalizing capabilities).
92 See Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Piaget's Stage
Theory of Development (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http://web.psych.ualberta.ca/-
-mike/PearlStreet/dictionary/contents/P/piaget' sstages.html> (describing
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stage is important in determining how to treat juveniles, since this
is where one distinguishes between acting for a good reason and
not acting at all.93 "At this level of development, people can solve
problems in their minds by isolating the important variables and
manipulating them mentally . . . . [T]he individual can draw
Piaget's four-stage theory of child development).
The Sensorimotor Period...
During this time, .. . a child's system is limited to motor
reflexes at birth, but the child builds on these reflexes to
develop more sophisticated procedures. They learn to
generalize their activities to a wider range of situations and
coordinate them into increasingly lengthy chains of behavior.
Preoperational Thought...
At this stage, . . . children acquire representational skills in
the areas mental imagery, and especially language. They are
self-oriented, and have egocentric view; that is, pre-
operational children can use these representational skills only
to view the world from their own perspective.
Concrete Operations...
As opposed to Preoperational children, children in the
concrete operations stage are able to take another's point of
view and take into account more than one perspective
simultaneously. They can also represent transformations as
well as static situations. Although they can understand
concrete problems, . . . they cannot perform on abstract
problems, and that they do not consider all of the logically
possible outcomes.
Formal Operations...
Children who attain the formal operation stage are capable
of thinking logically and abstractly. They can also reason
theoretically .... [A]lthough the children would still have
to revise their knowledge base, their way of thinking was as
powerful as it would get.
Id. For a more comprehensive discussion on child development through the four
stages, see BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1958) (explaining the process
of child development and the stages of mental maturation from birth to
adulthood).
" See Morse, supra note 82, at 25 (determining that an individual thinks
rationally when he is "flexible" or able to decide when it is good to act and
when he should refrain).
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meaningful conclusions from purely abstract or hypothetical
data."'94 This means that at twelve, juveniles, absent some mental
defect, begin to comprehend the difference between right and
wrong and the consequences of their actions.95 Therefore, an
individual, without mental defects, at the age of twelve is cognizant
because the person begins to have the capacity and ability to reason
logically, even though this capacity and ability may not yet be fully
developed.
Professor Stephen Morse96 expands on this idea by stating
that, although there are some characteristic differences between
adults and children that affect the juvenile's self-control and
judgment, juveniles are "able to control ... [their actions] to a
substantial degree, although it may be harder for them than for
adults." 97 In other words, even if juveniles act on impulse more
than the average adult does, they are mentally capable and
physically able to prevent themselves from acting on such an
impulse because they have the same rationalizing capabilities as an
adult.98 This is an indication that juveniles are rational beings.99
This rationalizing ability thereby eliminates peer pressure as an
excuse for criminal liability. Peer pressure has frequently been
94 JAMES V. MCCONNELL & RONALD P. PHILIPCHALK, UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 380 (7th ed. 1992) (explaining the development of a child's
mind in relation to Piaget's development model).
95 Id.
96 Morse, supra note 82, at 15. The author is a professor of psychology and
law at the University of Pennsylvania. Morse, supra note 82, at 15. Morse
expresses that although there are differences between juveniles and adults, the
differences may not be significant enough to treat the two groups as separate
entities. Morse, supra note 82, at 66. He emphasizes that this differentiation in
"treatment is a normative judgment that only society can make." Morse, supra
note 82, at 66.
" Morse, supra note 82, at 53.
98 See Morse, supra note 82, at 53 (addressing the issue of moral responsibil-
ity and blameworthiness in relation to juvenile criminal liability).
99 See Morse, supra note 82, at 53 (discussing the mental capacity of
juveniles and common misconceptions concerning the rationalizing capabilities
they have). In Professor Morse's own words, "[H]olding people morally
responsible involves the susceptibility to a set of reactive emotions that are
inherently linked to the practices that express those emotions." Morse, supra note
82, at 22.
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presumed to be the culprit of teenage criminal behavior.'O°
Although peer influence affects the decision-making power of the
teenager, it does not destroy the cognitive ability of teenagers to
rationalize the act and decide not to go through with it.'' The
fact that teenagers are more prone to risk-taking, especially on the
advice of others, does not warrant or justify decriminalizing their
conduct.10
2
Since juveniles have the capability to rationally decide whether
to engage in criminal behavior or not, even if this rationalizing
ability may not be developed fully, they are capable of appreciating
the crime. Therefore, they should be held accountable for their
actions as adults. The assumption that juveniles are not equipped
to exert self-control, and that teenagers are not morally blamewor-
thy because of the influence of peer pressure, is erroneous.'
0 3
Based on the above reasoning, juveniles twelve years of age and
older are cognitive beings and have the capability to exert self-
control if they so choose. Therefore, if twelve-year-olds all have
the mental capacity and physical ability to understand and refrain
'o See Scott & Grisso, supra note 14, at 162 (expressing that peer pressure
is a major part of teenage behavior and is assumed to be the reason for deviant
behavior).
'0' See Morse, supra note 82, at 55 ("If the primary variable adolescent
offenders underestimate is the risk of getting caught for their wrongdoing, this
is hardly [a] reason to think that they are less responsible."). "[A] child's
capacity to master impulses roughly parallels cognitive maturation, the
achievement of a basic knowledge of right and wrong, and the internalization of
that knowledge." Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile
Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 543 (1984) (proposing that the state should have
the burden of proof to demonstrate that a child between the ages of seven and
14 is morally blameworthy).
'02 See Morse, supra note 82, at 55 (advocating that although teenagers may
prefer to take risks, committing a serious crime is not the normal mode of
behavior teenagers use to illustrate their preference for risk).
13 See Morse, supra note 82, at 55 ("Although poor judgment may be
characteristic of adolescent risk-taking, there is no evidence that such judgment
also infects intentional criminal behavior."). Morse supports the proposition by
stating that treating a juvenile murderer as simply one looking for risk is to
decriminalize the conduct, which is not justified nor morally warranted. Morse,
supra note 82, at 55.
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from criminal conduct, they should all be treated the same
regardless of their geographical location.
B. State Law Discrepancies
Although the federal and state governments have made it easier
for juveniles to be transferred to criminal courts, discrepancies in
the juvenile laws between jurisdictions have resulted in disparate
judicial treatment.' °4 Offenders of the same crime are treated
differently across state lines and offenders of lesser crimes are
sometimes subject to harsher treatment than those who commit
more violent crimes. °5 But, the mental capacity of juveniles to
comprehend their actions is the same despite the location in which
they committed the crime. 10 6 It is therefore unfair to subject one
juvenile to harsh adult adversarial proceedings but allow another
accused of the same offense to be given special treatment just
because of geographical location.0 7
Many states statutorily prohibit treating child murderers as
adults. For instance, in Arkansas, a murderer under the age of
1'4 See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text (discussing differences
in juvenile proceedings between states and resulting disparate treatment of
offenders).
'05 See supra notes 116-129 and accompanying text (discussing the
discrepancies concerning treatment of juvenile offenders by the states). It is
absolutely unjust and illogical to subject a juvenile to prosecution as an adult for
committing a lesser crime of, for instance, rape, but not subject a juvenile of the
same age who committed murder to the criminal courts as well. See, e.g., United
States v. John Doe, 53 F.3d 1081 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a 17-year-old who
killed a woman was not to be subjected to the criminal court, but instead
adjudicated in the juvenile court); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998)
(holding that a 13-year-old defendant was correctly tried as an adult for the
crimes of first degree rape, first degree burglary and first degree sexual assault).
106 See generally RICHARD I. EVANS, JEAN PIAGET: THE MAN AND HIs
IDEAS (1973) (discussing Piaget's stages of cognitive development and explaining
Piaget's belief that every child passes through the four stages of development in
exactly the same order within the same age frame). See also supra note 92 and
accompanying text (describing the four stages of youth development according
to Piaget).
107 See SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 1, at 415 (stating that dispensing
justice on an individual basis does not further our justice system).
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fourteen must be tried as a juvenile, 0 8 while in Illinois anyone
under thirteen is not to be transferred to a criminal court.'0 9 A
one-year differential seems trivial, but it can mean the difference
between criminal responsibility and juvenile delinquency. As in the
case of the Jonesboro murders, the one-year differential precluded
the older boy from facing criminal penalties."0 The defendants
in the Jonesboro case were not adjudicated as adults."' Although
the two juveniles murdered five people, four being young girls
between the ages of eleven and twelve, and wounded ten others
with semiautomatic weapons, the laws of Arkansas prohibited the
prosecutor from seeking criminal proceedings.1' 2 Instead, the two
boys were prosecuted in a juvenile court. 3 They were saved
from the harsh and adversarial proceedings common in criminal
101 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(4) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999). "A
circuit court and a juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction and a prosecuting
attorney may charge a juvenile in either court when a case involves a juvenile
... [alt least fourteen (14) years old when he engages in conduct that, if
committed by an adult, would [constitute a felony]." Id. (emphasis added).
109 See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1998):
If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of
an act that constitutes a crime under the laws of this State and, on
motion of the State's Attorney, a Juvenile Judge ... finds that it is not
in the best interests of the minor or of the public to proceed under this
Act, the court may enter an order permitting prosecution under the
criminal laws.
Id.
"o See Lois Romano, Arkansas Pair Found Guilty of 5 Slayings; School
Shooters Can Go Free at Age 21, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1998, at A3 (reporting
on the juvenile court's sentencing of the convicted defendants of the Jonesboro
case).
.. See Romano, supra note 110, at A3 (stating that the boys were
prosecuted in a juvenile court since the criminal court had no jurisdiction over
them because of their young ages).
112 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(4) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999)
(mandating that the juvenile be at least 14 to be prosecuted as an adult for capital
murder); Verhovek, supra note 4, at Al (reporting on the casualties from the
Jonesboro incident).
"3 See Bloodshed, supra note 6, at Al (reporting that because of the boys'
ages, 11 and 13, they were outside the criminal court's jurisdiction because of
Arkansas's juvenile statute). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text
(stating the juvenile law of Arkansas).
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court and the stigma of being labeled a criminal.114 It is illogical
and unfair to allow two Arkansas boys who intentionally and
viciously gun-downed five people to be given protection from
criminal prosecution solely because the killings occurred in
Arkansas and not, for example, in Missouri." 5 The severity of the
crime is still the same and should therefore be treated the same.
However, this type of disparate treatment occurs more frequently
than most people would expect.
The states vary as to how they treat juveniles offenders. Some
states allow the criminal prosecution of children, regardless of their
age." 6 In Pennsylvania, a nine-year-old boy who was accused of
murdering an individual was convicted by the state's criminal
courts. 117 Just recently, authorities in Michigan prosecuted an
eleven-year-old boy as an adult for first-degree murder for the
intentional shooting of an eighteen-year-old. 118 Additionally, two
114 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the difference
between juvenile and adult treatment).
15 See Verhovek, supra note 4, at Al (reporting on the deaths in the
Jonesboro incident). Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(4) (Michie 1998
& Supp. 1999) (requiring a minimum age of 14 for criminal prosecution) with
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (setting the minimum age
for transfer at 12). Had the attack by the two boys occurred across the border,
in Missouri, there may have been a drastically different result. The prosecutors
in Missouri would not be barred from seeking criminal adjudication of the older
boy. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999). And, if judicial
discretion permitted such a prosecution, the boy would be subject to criminal
adult sanctions, such as adversarial proceedings and criminal status. See Aron &
Hurley, supra note 30, at 12 n. 10 (distinguishing the criminal court proceedings
from the juvenile court proceedings).
116 See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 614 (S.D. 1998) (affirming
the trial court's conviction of the 14-year-old as an adult for the shooting death
and robbery of a cab driver).
"7 Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308, 1313 (Pa. 1992) (opining on
the use of criteria for the denial of transfer to a juvenile court of a nine-year-old
accused of murder). The boy, Cameron Kocher, was charged with murder in
1989 and was later convicted. Pam Belluck, Chicago Boys, 7 and 8, Charged in
the Brutal Killing of a Girl, 11, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at Al (reporting the
story of two boys who allegedly murdered an infant girl). The two Chicago boys
may be tried in an adult court for the criminal charge of murder. Id.
118 See David Zeman, Lawyer May Be Issue at Child's Murder Trial;
Appointment Reveals Irony in Laws on Juveniles, Adults, TIMES-PICAYUNE
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fourteen-year-olds are being prosecuted as adults for conspiring to
commit mass murder against students attending their middle
school.119 Similarly, in North Carolina, a thirteen-year-old boy
accused of first degree rape, first degree burglary and first degree
sexual assault was transferred to the criminal courts and denied
access to a juvenile proceeding.1 20 That court held that "[t]he
cruelty of the attack, its predatory nature toward an essential
stranger, [and the] defendant's refusal to accept full responsibility
... all suggest [that the] defendant is not particularly suited to the
purpose and type of rehabilitation dominant in the juvenile justice
system." 121 Further, fourteen and fifteen-year-olds, who commit
murders in Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts
(MICHIGAN), June 28, 1998, at A 17 (reporting on Nathaniel Abraham's upcoming
murder trial in Michigan). Nathaniel Abraham was convicted on November 16,
1999, of second-degree murder. See Keith Bradsher, Michigan Boy Who Killed
at 11 Is Convicted of Murder as Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al
(reporting on the second-degree murder verdict of Abraham). Nathaniel could be
sentenced to up to life in prison as an adult or sentenced as a juvenile and be
detained until age 21. Jim Irwin, Boy, 13, Convicted of Murder in Michigan, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at 32.
119 See National News Briefs; Teenagers Plotted to Kill At School, Police
Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at A14 (briefing on the mass-murder plot). The
judge ordered that the two boys, Justin Schnepp and Jedaiah (David) Zinzo, be
tried as adults for the charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. See
2 in Michigan Face Adult Trial in School Plot, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1999, at 21
(stating the orders of the court concerning jurisdiction for adjudication). There
were two other boys, age 13, arrested with Schnepp and Zinzo under the same
charges, but a judge ordered them to juvenile court. Id. The four were planning
to kill more people than Klebold and Harris had in Columbine. See 4 Boys
Charged With Plotting Attack on Middle School in Michigan, CmI. TRIB., May
16, 1999, at 3 (reporting on the arrest of the boys). The Michigan statute allows
for the court to try 14-year-olds in criminal court. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.4 (West 1998).
120 See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998) (holding that the
juvenile was correctly transferred to stand trial as an adult and a mandatory life
sentence was not excessive). North Carolina allows for the transfer of 13-year-
olds to criminal court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1995). This court found that
after balancing the factors for transfer, the juvenile was rightly transferred out
of juvenile court. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832.
121 Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832.
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are also treated as adults. 22 Other courts have even extended
adult status to those individuals that commit lesser crimes, such as
first-degree assault and armed robbery.123
In contrast, some states have chosen the opposite direction,
protecting all persons not of majority from the criminalization
inherent in adult treatment. In 1989, a seventeen-year-old boy from
Washington was found "guilty of the delinquent act of second
degree murder."' 24 The boy apparently killed a woman on the
Sauk-Suiattle reservation located in the State of Washington.125
He was not tried as an adult, but adjudicated through the juvenile
system. 126 Although the State of Washington allows for the
transfer of fifteen-year-olds to criminal court, it also provides for
judicial discretion, which permitted the court to keep the case
22 See Ponder v. State, 953 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Ark. 1997) (subjecting a 14-
year-old to prosecution as an adult for capital murder of a 75-year-old woman);
People v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 958 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. 1998) (holding
two 15-year-olds fit to stand trial in criminal court); Petithomme v. State, 610
So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding a 15-year-old accountable
to criminal liability for vehicular homicide); People v. Luckett, 692 N.E.2d 1345,
1346-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (trying a 15-year-old for second-degree murder in
criminal court); Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Mass. 1996)
(holding a 15-year-old criminally responsible for the gruesome death of a
woman). Arkansas, Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts all have statutes setting
minimum ages for transfer at 13 or 14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie
1998 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226 (West 1998)
(14 years of age unless voluntarily asks to be tried as an adult); 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (West 1998) (13 years of age); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 74 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (14 years of age).
123 See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (permitting the
transfer of a 16-year-old out of juvenile court for the offense of first-degree
assault); State v. Jose C., No. CR6-421185, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 754, at
*2 (D. New Haven Mar. 21, 1996) (holding a 14-year-old criminally liable for
armed robbery). See also State v. Hall, No. 16549-3-111, 1998 Wash. App.
LEXIS 815, at *1 (3d Div. June 2, 1998) (opining on the pleas of a 13-year-old
being arraigned in a criminal court for burglary).
124 See United States v. John Doe, 53 F.3d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the juvenile was guilty of a delinquent act of murder and sentencing
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within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.12 7 In New Mexico,
a seventeen-year-old juvenile murdered a toddler and the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied a
motion to transfer the minor accused of murder to a criminal
court. 1 8 And, in Alabama, the state supreme court declined to
transfer a juvenile, age fourteen, to criminal court even though the
juvenile was charged with committing murder. 29
Although some seventeen-year-olds are treated as juveniles in
murder cases, the federal and most state governments treat sixteen
and seventeen-year-olds as adults. 3 ° These legislatures and courts
believe that persons who have attained the age of sixteen and
seventeen are fully capable of assuming the full moral responsibili-
ties of an adult.13 ' Therefore, holding them to the same standards
127 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.110 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(allowing 15-year-olds to be transferred to the criminal courts). WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.40.110 also provides that the court has the authority to decide
what is in the best interests of the juvenile and the public. Id. This means that
the court can decline a transfer regardless of the age of the juvenile. Id.
128 United States v. Leon, 132 F.2d 583, 584 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a 17-year-old charged with murdering a three-year-old child was not permitted
to be transferred to criminal court). The court denied a transfer even though the
statute permitted the court to do so with minors 14 years of age and older. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3 (Michie 1999).
129 See Exparte J.D.G., 604 So. 2d 378, 384 (Ala. 1992) (holding that a 14-
year-old boy was not to be tried as an adult for shooting an unarmed 18-year-old
in a motel parking lot). But see Ex parte J.R., 582 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1991)
(holding a 15-year-old to be adjudicated in a criminal court for the offense of
capital murder).
130 See United States v. Lanny B., No. 93-30202, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
9404, *4-*7 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1994), aff'd, 24 F.3d 251 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
a 16-year-old to adult status for murder and assault); United States v. Alexander,
695 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendant, who was 16 at the
time he committed the crime, was not improperly transferred for four counts of
first-degree murder committed during a felony). See also Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 366, 381 (1989) (holding that sentencing to death a 17-year-old
who committed murder, sodomy, robbery and received stolen property was not
cruel and unusual punishment); supra notes 57, 58 (indicating the statutory ages
that juveniles will be transferred to the criminal courts).
' Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
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as an adult is not only fair and just, but more importantly,
acceptable. 13 2 Examples of such states that hold sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds criminally liable are Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas and South Carolina. The Supreme Court of Alabama
determined that a sixteen-year-old who participated in cutting a
man's throat and then covering the body with bags was subject to
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts of the state.'33 Similarly, in
Alaska, a seventeen-year-old boy was prosecuted as an adult for
burglary, robbery and murder.3 4 The Alaska Court of Appeals
held that the juvenile was appropriately waived to the criminal
court. 3' And, in Arkansas, the Supreme Court decided that a
sixteen-year-old who murdered, raped, burglarized and committed
theft was eligible for waiver to the criminal courts. 136 Further-
more, in South Carolina, a sixteen-year-old, who murdered a girl
by strangulation, was transferred out of the juvenile court.137
The lack of uniformity among the states in the adjudication of
crimes committed by juveniles is problematic. Although, currently,
all fifty states and the District of Columbia allow for the transfer
of juveniles from the juvenile system to criminal court, depending
132 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 n.4 (expressing that the
Court considers evolving standards of decency when determining how to treat
juveniles in the law).
133 Ex parte Brown, 540 So. 2d 740, 745 (Ala. 1989) (holding the juvenile
defendant to adult status for participating in the murder of a man and then
disposing of the body by wrapping it up in a sleeping bag and a garbage bag).
134 P.K.M. v. State, 780 P.2d 395, 396-98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)
(determining that the juvenile should be subjected to the criminal court for his
crimes).
135 Id. at 400. The court based its conclusion on such factors as amenability
to treatment, seriousness of the offense, history of delinquency, probable causes
of the behavior, and availability of facilities. Id. at 396.
136 Sanford v. State, 962 S.W.2d 335, 342-43 (Ark. 1998) (holding that the
lower court properly determined whether to allow the juvenile to be tried in the
adult courts or adjudicated in the juvenile system).
137 State v. Kelsey, 502 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1998) (opining on the transfer of a
juvenile into criminal court). This teen not only murdered a girl by strangulation,
but he proceeded to rape her post-mortem and then blew up her body with a pipe
bomb. Id. at 68.
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on the age of the offender and the offense committed,138 each
jurisdiction espouses a different view regarding the adjudication of
juvenile delinquents. 39 This discrepancy, coupled with the
discretion given to the courts, causes disparate treatment for the
commission of murder.140 Similar treatment of juvenile murderers
would be assured through the immediate transfer of juveniles to
criminal court in all states.
141
C. The Call for Automatic Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court Everywhere
To eliminate the disparate treatment from state to state of
juvenile delinquents for similar criminal offenses, society requires
uniformity in the law by employing the same juvenile procedures
nationwide. Currently, each individual state implements its own
standards, 142 resulting in statutes that vary in requirements as to
which cases are adjudicated in the criminal courts. 43 These
138 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (referring to state statutes
and the criteria to be satisfied for transfer to adult status).
... See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (evidencing the difference
in state allowance of transfer based upon the ages and offenses of the juvenile
offender).
140 Age and offense are not the only factors to determine whether to transfer
a juvenile offender to adult status. Factors such as living environment, prior
record, the effectiveness of rehabilitation and mental maturity are also
considered. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100 (Michie 1998); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-817 (1998 & Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-276 (1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (1994 & Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7303-4.3 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.349 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 14-1-7 (1994 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (Michie 1999);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999).
14' Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 580 (describing automatic transfer
as the immediate transfer of the juvenile offender to a criminal court without any
judicial discretion or considering any extenuating factors or circumstances).
142 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the factors the
courts use to determine whether a case will be heard in a juvenile court or
adjudicated in a criminal court).
143 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (listing some examples of cases
that are transferred to criminal court in relation to age and the crime committed).
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inconsistent statutes must be uniformly redrafted to accommodate
the severity of the crimes juveniles are committing today, especial-
ly murder.'" Amending the JDA is a good starting point as it
would act as a catalyst for a national reformation of all juvenile
statutes in relation to the violent offense of murder.'45
For children twelve years of age and older who are accused of
murder, the law should be amended to mandate immediate
transfer 146 to the criminal courts without any consideration of
extenuating factors. 147 The criminal courts then would evaluate,
'" See Klein, supra note 8, at 373-74 (discussing that juvenile law is slowly
shifting back to a focus on punishment instead of rehabilitation). "[W]ith the
increased public outcry to 'get tough' on juvenile crime, . . . [f]ormality,
restrictiveness, and punishment are gradually becoming the contemporary
principles of the juvenile justice system." Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at
564. "[State] legislatures retreated from a belief in the concept of parens patriae
and instead embraced a belief in deterrence and retribution, the main principles
of the 'just desserts' model." Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 569
(emphasis in original).
145 See Meet the Press, supra note 76 (interviewing house representatives to
elicit their reactions to the Jonesboro murders). "[T]he federal government...
play[s an important role] in encouraging the states to develop more effective
policies, particularly to deal with violent children." Meet the Press, supra note
76. After the JDA was implemented in 1938, all the states by the mid-1940's
enacted their own juvenile statutes. See Dunham, supra note 29, at 509
(describing the history and the procedures of the federal and state juvenile justice
systems).
146 Immediate transfer removes the youth automatically to criminal court
"without a motion by the prosecutor or a decision by the juvenile court judge."
Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 580.
147 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1996). Factors to be considered are:
the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged
offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency
record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychologi-
cal maturity; the nature of the past treatment efforts and the juvenile's
response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat
the juvenile's behavioral problems.
Id.
Some states have already enacted such laws for automatic transfer, like
Arizona, New York and North Dakota. Arizona mandates that juveniles ages 15
and older who are "accused of murder, forcible sexual assault, armed robbery or
other violent felony offenses ... shall be prosecuted as adults." ARIZ. REv.
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at the request of the prosecution, defense, or at the discretion of the
trial court, whether the juvenile has any mental dysfunctions, such
as insanity, that would prevent the juvenile from standing trial. 148
After psychological evaluation, the judge and the prosecutor could
then decide whether to proceed with the trial or send the delinquent
to an institution where the defendant would be given the proper
medical attention required. 49 Importantly, there would be no
STAT. ANN. § 22(1) (West 1998). NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 30.00(1) (McKinney
1998) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subdivision two of this section, a
person less than sixteen years old is not criminally responsible for his or her
conduct." Section 30.00(2) states "a person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of
age is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree."
Holding the juvenile criminally responsible means that he or she is subject to the
criminal courts instead of the juvenile courts and is subject to criminal liability,
not just juvenile detention. See Morse, supra note 82, at 25 (expressing that a
juvenile's act is not criminal unless he or she is able to rationally and morally
understand the actions taken). N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b) (1991 & Supp.
1999) states that when there is probable cause to believe a child 14 years or
older committed the offense of murder, that child shall be transferred to the
criminal courts.
148 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 310. It is a common procedure to evaluate
the alleged murderer's mental health before proceeding with the trial. DRESSLER,
supra note 61, at 310. "The issue of competency to stand trial may be raised by
the prosecutor, the defense, or by the trial court on its own motion." DRESSLER,
supra note 61, at 310. This is a procedural safeguard to protect those who are
psychologically disturbed from being penalized from that which they are not
mentally responsible for. DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 310. Juveniles accused of
murder will be evaluated in the same fashion as their adult counterparts. The
juvenile would be evaluated to see if he or she has the capacity to consult her
attorney "with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and if he or she
understands the proceedings against her. DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 310. The
determination of capacity is usually elicited through a psychiatric evaluation
which is then submitted to the courts to allow for the judge to decide whether
the individual is competent to stand trial. DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 311.
149 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 312 (describing the procedures to
determine one's ability to stand trial). A person is determined to be fit to stand
trial if the person has the mental capacity to appreciate what he or she has
committed. See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 103. One has to have a "morally




option to send the child back to the juvenile courts for adjudica-
tion. 50
Minors who have not reached the minimum required age for
automatic transfer would remain subjected to the juvenile
courts.151 These juveniles would not be held accountable as adults
for their actions because they are not capable of logical
thought. 152 Our legal system is based on adjudicating individuals
who are capable of appreciating the wrong and not acting purely on
impulse. 153 Therefore, because children under the age of twelve
cannot appreciate their malevolent behavior, they must be adjudi-
cated in juvenile court, whereas children twelve and older can
appreciate such behavior and must be tried in a criminal court.
III. ADULT PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILES TRIED IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS
Even with the imposition of an automatic waiver to criminal
court for juvenile offenders charged with the crime of murder, the
severity of the crime may still be diminished if the courts later
impose lesser sentences upon conviction.1 54 Due to the public's
concern over the well-being of juvenile criminals, the courts have
150 The state legislatures provided the courts with discretionary powers that
permit the courts to allow a juvenile proceeding even though the statute provides
for transfer. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the factors courts
take into consideration when contemplating whether to adjudicate the child under
a juvenile proceeding or try the child as an adult).
151 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (stating the ages that states
allow transfers to occur); see also Romano, supra note 110, at A3 (stating that
the Jonesboro murderers were prosecuted in juvenile court because the criminal
court had no jurisdiction over them due to the fact they were under the age of
14 at the time they were being tried).
152 See supra Part II.A, discussing the mental development of children and
when juveniles are capable of rationally understanding their actions and
consequences.
153 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 103. Punishing those who do not
understand their actions does not benefit the individual or society as a whole
since the individual does not know that he committed a wrong. See DRESSLER,
supra note 61, at 103.
154 See infra Part III.B, discussing how the current legal system allows for
lesser punishment for juveniles, thereby treating them as victims.
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either shortened the sentences of these criminals or mandated that
juveniles serve out their sentences in a rehabilitative center rather
than a prison.'55 These sentences neither deter future criminal
conduct nor compensate the family of the deceased victim. 156 By
implementing a prison system that segregates juvenile criminals
from their adult counterparts, justice can be achieved by subjecting
these juveniles to longer sentences, carried out in a prison, thereby
punishing them, and at the same time protecting their well-
being.
157
A recent example of the implementation of harsher punishment
for juveniles occurred in Oregon. Kipland Kinkel, a sixteen-year-
old, was sentenced to life imprisonment for a similar crime as the
one committed in Jonesboro. 158 Kinkel murdered two of his
155 See Feld, supra note 35, at 115-18 (discussing that criminal courts
consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor in the determination of sentences).
Criminal courts in some jurisdictions already consider "youthfulness"
in the context of aggravating and mitigating factors, and may impose
shorter sentences on a discretionary basis. Although the federal
sentencing guidelines explicitly reject "youthfulness" as a justification
to sentence outside the guidelines range, sentencing statutes in some
states recognize "youthfulness" as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
Feld, supra note 35, at 116. McKinley DaWayne Moore, who pleaded guilty to
killing a man, received a sentence of juvenile rehabilitation and the possibility
of going to prison dependent on his cooperation with the rehabilitative efforts.
See also Another Teen Serving Adult Time in State, GRAND RAPIDS PRESs, Nov.
18, 1999, at A25 (comparing Abraham's potential sentencing to another recent
juvenile offender).
156 See infra Part III.B, discussing the three theories of punishment:
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation.
157 See Dunham, supra note 29, at 509 (stating that the reform movement
was also a response to keep children and hardened criminals separated). The
juvenile court was a response "to the need long-felt by the reform element in
American Society that a child who had been convicted of violating a law should
not be confined with hardened criminals in jails and penitentiaries, where, it was
believed, only further demoralization and corruption could ensue." Dunham,
supra note 29, at 509.
158 See Jeff Barnard, Oregon School Shooter Gets 112 Years, ASsOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28138383 (reporting Kinkel
received a 112 year sentence for the murders). Kinkel was obsessed by death,
killing and guns. See Don Terry & Frank Bruni, Shootings in a Schoolhouse: The
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, § 1, at 14 (providing a biographical
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classmates and injured twenty-two, and it was later discovered that
Kinkel had killed his parents prior to the school shooting.159
Kinkel, tried as an adult, was charged with "[four] counts of
aggravated murder, [twenty-six] counts of attempted aggravated
murder, [six] counts of first-degree assault, [eighteen] counts of
second-degree assault [and] unlawful possession of a firearm."' 160
Courts do not always apply such tough sanctions to juvenile
murderers. Both the Arkansas and Oregon schoolhouse killings
involved juveniles who deliberately and successfully set out to kill
their classmates. 16' However, only in Kinkel's case did the court
attempt to punish the murderer by subjecting him to a long prison
sentence after being found guilty of murder.162 Kinkel's punish-
ment resulted from the fact that he was treated as an adult and,
therefore, tried in the criminal court, while the Jonesboro offenders,
for nearly the same crime, were given juvenile status and only
subjected to juvenile court. 163 The disparate results were due to
perspective on Kipland Kinkel). He recorded his violent fantasies in a journal.
Id. Kinkel decided to carry out his fantasies in May 1998, when he opened fire
in his school cafeteria. See Oregon School Shooting Suspect Arraigned, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1998, at A14 [hereinafter Oregon School] (reporting on the legal
proceedings against Kipland Kinkel for opening fire on his classmates inside his
high school and for killing his parents in their house).
"9 See Terry & Bruni, supra note 158, § 1, at 14 (describing the details of
the shooting in the Thurston High cafeteria).
160 See Oregon School, supra note 158, at A14 (reporting on the legal
charges brought by the state against Kinkel).
161 See supra notes 66-72 and 159-61 (describing the Jonesboro and Oregon
incidents).
162 See Oregon School, supra note 158, at A 14 (stating that Kinkel could be
sentenced to life if convicted as an adult). Kipland Kinkel pleaded guilty to the
charges against him on September 25, 1999. Sam Howe Verhovek, Teenager
Pleads Guilty in School Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at A9 (discussing
the recent developments in the Kinkel trial). Kinkel can be sentenced to 25 years
plus an additional seven-and-a-half years for each of the 26 counts of attempted
murder. Id. On November 11, 1999, Kipland Kinkel was sentenced to 112 years
in prison without parole. See Barnard, supra note 158 (discussing the sentence).
Kinkel's defense attorneys had agreed to a plea of 25 years for the four killings
and an indeterminate sentence for the 26 attempted murder counts.
163 See The Jonesboro Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1998, at A24 [hereinaf-
ter Jonesboro] (reporting on the sentencing of the two juveniles that murdered
four of their classmates); Oregon School, supra note 158, at A14 (discussing the
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both the differences in the ages of the juveniles and the state
statutes governing juvenile adjudication.' 64
A. Federal and State Inconsistencies in the Sentencing of
Juvenile Offenders
It is unreasonable for a person, capable of understanding and
appreciating his actions, therefore morally culpable and blamewor-
thy, to receive special treatment because he has not attained a
certain age.165 In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States
holds this belief since prohibiting capital sentencing of those under
the age of sixteen is the only restriction the Court has imposed on
the states. 166 Once a juvenile is prosecuted in the criminal court,
trial proceeding that Kinkel will face); Romano, supra note 110, at A3 (stating
that the boys were prosecuted in a juvenile court since the criminal court had no
jurisdiction over them because of their young ages). The policy in Arkansas is
to keep juvenile delinquents in a juvenile detention facility until they attain the
age of 18. Id. The statute actually regulates that juvenile delinquents be held until
21, but because all the juvenile facilities in Arkansas only house inmates until
they turn 18, the state cannot detain the juvenile past 18. Id. Until Arkansas
builds accommodations for those 18 to 21, all juvenile convicts will only be
detained until their 18th birthday. Id. Since the oldest boy was 14 at the time of
his conviction, the state is only permitted to institutionalize him in the juvenile
detention facility for a maximum of four years. Jonesboro, supra, at A24.
'64 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (stating
only those age 14 and over are allowed to be waived to the criminal courts); OR.
REv. STAT. § 419C.349 (1997) (allowing a juvenile of any age to be transferred
to the criminal courts at the determination of the court). Because the two
juveniles in Jonesboro were not old enough to be tried as adults, they were tried
in a juvenile court, which only permitted the judge to sentence the boys to a
maximum of four years in a juvenile facility. See Jonesboro, supra note 163, at
A24 (indicating that since the state does not have a facility to hold those between
the ages of 18 and 21, the juvenile delinquents can only legally be held until the
age of 18).
165 See supra Part II.A, discussing moral culpability.
166 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832-33 (holding that those under the age of 16
cannot be subjected to capital punishment). However, the Court did not state that
life imprisonment for a 12-year-old was considered cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. "[Clontemporary morality is not ready to permit the regular imposition
of the harshest of sanctions in such cases." See id. at 821 n.7. "The road we have
traveled during the past four decades-in which thousands of juries have tried
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he should be subject to a prison term similar to ones shared by
others that have reached the majority that committed the identical
crime of murder. There is no need for a juvenile to get a "youth
discount," 167 whereby after conviction in a criminal court, he re-
ceives a reduced sentence based solely on his age. 168
It is not uncommon for a court to subject a juvenile to criminal
punishment after it has been determined that the juvenile is guilty
of an adult crime. 169 Some courts have even gone so far as to
impose the maximum sentences available, barring in certain cases
murder cases-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the
conscience of the community." Id. at 832. Both the American Bar Association
and the American Law Institute oppose the imposition of capital punishment on
children. Id. at 830 nn.32, 33 (citing American Bar Association, Summary of
Action Taken by the House of Delegates 17 (1983 Annual Meeting); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6, commentary, at 133 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980)).
167 Feld, supra note 35, at 115. The term "youth discount" describes a
proposal to minimize the length of a juvenile's criminal imprisonment by
subtracting or discounting the sentence imposed to reflect the youthfulness of the
individual. Feld, supra note 35, at 115-16. Feld uses this as a compromise to
treat juveniles as adults in the criminal system, thereby eliminating the need for
a separate juvenile justice system. Feld, supra note 35, at 115.
168 Feld, supra note 35, at 115-22. Feld proposes to eliminate the entire
juvenile justice system and implement a discount system to accommodate the
juveniles in criminal court. Feld, supra note 35, at 117-18. His system would
allow the courts to search for special punishment treatment of minors, thereby
treating the minors differently from their adult counterparts. Feld, supra note 35,
at 117-18.
169 See, e.g., Petithomme v. State, 610 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (reversing the trial court's decision to sentence a 15-year-old, who had just
been convicted of murder, as an adult); People v. Luckett, 692 N.E.2d 1345,
1346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (sentencing a 15-year-old convicted murderer to 20
years imprisonment).
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capital punishment. 170 For example, in State v. Green, 71 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina sentenced a thirteen-year-old
convicted defendant to life imprisonment and held that it was "not
grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed."'172 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota held the same when it sentenced a
fifteen-year-old defendant to life imprisonment without parole for
thirty years for committing murder. 7 3 In a more recent case, a
fifteen-year-old Florida boy was tried and convicted of the adult
crime of first degree murder, resulting in a mandatory life sentence
with no chance of parole.'74
170 See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (discussing cases
imposing life sentences on juveniles). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 380 (1989) (holding that imposing the death penalty on 16 and 17-year-olds
is not cruel and unusual punishment and, therefore, does not violate the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838
(1988) (prohibiting a 15-year-old from facing the death penalty because a
juvenile under the age of 16 is not mature enough to assume all the responsibili-
ties of an adult).
171 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998).
172 Id. at 832 (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment for a 13-year-old
is not disproportionate to the crime committed and also is not considered cruel
and unusual punishment as prohibited by the United States Constitution). In
Green, the defendant was accused of first-degree rape, first-degree burglary and
first-degree sexual offense. Id. at 822. The defendant apparently broke into the
woman's apartment, attacked her and then raped her in front of her son. Id. at
823.
173 See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Minn. 1998) (upholding that
life imprisonment, as opposed to capital punishment, is not prohibited by the
Constitution when it comes to a 15-year-old). Mitchell follows the reasoning in
Green and Thompson that if the punishment is not disproportionate to the crime
and does not violate the "evolving standards of decency," the sentence will be
upheld. Id. at 489. Mitchell fatally shot a 19-year-old store clerk during a
convenience store robbery. Id. at 483. He unsuccessfully appealed his sentence,
arguing that sentencing a minor his age to life imprisonment was cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution. Id. The court opined that life
imprisonment is neither disproportionate to the crime nor violative of society's
"evolving standards of decency" and, therefore, not prohibited by law. Id. at 489-
90.
174 See National News Briefs; 15-Year-Old Killer Gets Life in Prison, N.Y.
T)MES, Aug. 21, 1999, at A14 (discussing the sentencing of Joshua Phillips for
first degree murder). On November 3, 1998, Joshua Phillips, 14, stabbed his
eight-year-old neighbor, Maddie Clifton, to death. See Bryan Robinson, Florida
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However, when the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the sentencing of a fifteen-year-old defendant to death, the
Supreme Court of the United States declared this type of punish-
ment unconstitutional because it was in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.'75 The Court held that although the juvenile did
commit the reprehensible act of murder, invoking the death penalty
on those under the age of sixteen would violate society's "evolving
standards of decency"'76 and be considered "generally abhorrent
Teen Faces Trial for the Death of 8-Year-Old Neighbor (visited July 9, 1999)
<http://www.courttv.com/trials/phillips/070299_ctv.html> (reporting on the
murder of Maddie Clifton). After the killing, Joshua hid the body under his
mattress to keep his actions from being discovered. See id. The body was
discovered seven days later by his mother. See id.
In Florida, a 14-year-old accused of murder is tried as an adult. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 985.226 (West 1998). Joshua was tried as an adult for the charge
of first-degree murder. A jury quickly convicted him of the crime. See Bryan
Robinson, Florida Teen Found Guilty of First-Degree Murder, Faces Mandatory
Life Sentence in 8-Year-Old Neighbor's Death (visited July 9, 1999) <http://-
dailynews.yahoo.com/headline> (stating that it took the jury only two hours to
convict Joshua Phillips of murder in the first degree for the death of Maddie
Clifton). Because Florida mandates a life sentence without parole for a first-
degree murder conviction, Joshua was later sentenced to prison for life with no
chance of parole. See Bill Heery, Trial in Girl's Killing Moves from Jacksonville
to Bartow, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 23, 1999, at Florida/Metro-4 (stating that if
Phillips is convicted of the crime, he faces a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole); National News Briefs; 15-Year-Old Killer Gets Life in Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1999, at A14 (reporting on the sentencing of Joshua
Phillips).
... See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. The court draws a line for the infliction
of capital punishment at the age of 16. Id. The Court was "not persuaded that the
imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by persons under 16 years
of age has made, or can be expected to make, any measurable contribution to the
goals that capital punishment is intended to achieve. It is therefore, 'nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' . . .
and thus an unconstitutional punishment." Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)). The Court affirmed this ruling a year later in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). There, the Court denied the appeals of 16 and
17-year-old defendants who claimed that the death sentence for 16 and 17-year-
old defendants violated "evolving standards of decency" and, thus, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 377-78.
176 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.4. The Court consistently considers
evolving standards of decency, as settled in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
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to the conscience of the community."' 177 The Court affirmed its
under-sixteen limitation on the death penalty a year later when it
denied the appeals of a sixteen and seventeen-year-old defendant
to declare their death sentences unconstitutional. 7 8 It held that
there was no national consensus that forbids imposing capital
punishment on these juveniles under the reasoning that persons of
at least sixteen years of age have the full mental capacity to
assume all adult responsibilities.' 79
The severity and brutality of the crime is not lessened because
of the youthfulness of the individual. Thus, the consequences of the
crime must not be trivialized. To ensure substantive punishment,
courts should penalize these juveniles as adults and adopt a penal
and prison system to accommodate minors.
B. Proposed Change to the Punishment System-
Rehabilitation Does Not Work
The present penal system is not strong enough in the area of
juvenile criminal punishment. The system is lopsidedly focused on
rehabilitating the juvenile, trying to transform the child into an
acceptable member of society, rather than punishing the child for
the crime committed. 180 A better system incorporates both reha-
bilitative ideals as well as retributive and deterrence concepts,
349 (1910), in invoking the death penalty. Id. In determining what comports with
these standards, courts look at legislation and jury sentences. Id. at 823 n.7.
171 Id. at 816.
178 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
179 Id.
8o See SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 1, at 415.
[T]he entire conception of 'individualized justice' requires reassess-
ment.... [T]he basic notion of 'treating' the child's broad problems,
rather than reacting to a specific law violation, appear[s not] to further
the aim of 'rehabilitation' in any meaningful way. In fact the sense of
injustice to which this approach gives rise may ... actively reinforce
attitudes that breed delinquency.
SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 1, at 415.
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thereby seeking to reform the juvenile and punishing him concur-
rently. 8
An explanation as to why the juvenile justice system seems to
be so lenient on youths who commit serious offenses, like murder,
is that "[t]he youngsters whom the founders of the juvenile court
sought to help were, for the most part, charged with minor
offenses."'' 82 But, as the juvenile court reformation evolved, the
goal became one of helping all juveniles. 8 3 Rehabilitation may
be a satisfactory approach to correct or treat minors that steal from
a store or graffiti a wall, but when addressing violent crimes like
murder, rehabilitation is not beneficial for the minor or society.184
By treating the juvenile convict as a victim, the seriousness of
the crime is diluted. 185 Such treatment does not compensate the
victim, nor does it prevent the crime from being committed
again. 86 Punishment of the convict as the perpetrator achieves
the opposite result. It exemplifies society's lack of tolerance for the
181 See Transformation, supra note 37, at 708 (stating "individualization
neither reduces recidivism nor provides a principled basis for coercive
intervention"). Feld further states that such treatment "[m]oreover ... produces
unequal results among similarly situated offenders and punishes minor offenders
excessively and serious ones leniently." Transformation, supra note 37, at 708
(citations omitted).
182 Thomas Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 215 (1997) (proposing that the juvenile justice
system be reinvigorated to deal with juvenile offenders ranging from minor
offenses to the most serious of offenses).
183 id.
'84 See United States v. NJB, 104 F.3d 630, 637 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
there is a "growing recognition that for some of these juveniles, the rehabilitation
theory upon which the current juvenile justice system is based is not always
adequate to protect the public interest") (citation omitted).
185 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111 (discussing criminal behavior as
a disease). The child is placed in a rehabilitative center in order to correct
society's negative influence on the juvenile, which is thought to be the cause of
child misconduct. Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111. By making the child
believe that it was the illness that caused the actions he took, we are enforcing
the idea that they are faultless and without recourse. See Kamenstein, supra note
13, at 2111.
186 See Fritsch & Hemjmens, supra note 8, at 568 (expressing that a study
done on juvenile delinquency found that about 18% of the juvenile offenders
were the cause of more than half of the crimes committed by juveniles).
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behavior and forces the victim to own up to his acts through
incarceration.'87 It also emphasizes that juveniles are not different
than other criminals, placing the deserved stigma of criminality on
the youths instead of that of helplessness.'88
Punishment should serve three purposes: retribution, deterrence
and rehabilitation. 89 Retribution demands that when one takes
something away from another, one must compensate the victim for
that loss by having something taken away from him.' 90 Deter-
rence, a more utilitarian concept, entails punishing people as a
means to improve society.'9' Under a deterrence rationale, certain
individuals are used as examples to illustrate to all that a particular
behavior will not be tolerated without penalization in an attempt to
defer future commissions of a crime. 92 Rehabilitation aims to
change individuals to conform to society's expectations. 193 All of
these purposes combined form the ideal punishment system since
it "right[s] a wrong .... reaffirms the victim's worth as a human
being," 94 and prevents others from committing the same
crime. 195
The adult penal system satisfactorily incorporates these three
purposes by mandating a sentence long enough to compensate for
the loss of the victims' lives, making the prison experience
unpleasant in an effort to dissuade others from committing similar
crimes and establishing programs within the prison system to
187 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 12 (discussing the retributive theory of
punishment which emphasizes society's want for balance, i.e., an eye for an eye).
188 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111 (stating that rehabilitation was
implemented to make juveniles feel less like criminals and more like victims of
society).
189 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 7-17.
190 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 12. Punishment serves to create a moral
balance in society, not to hurt criminals. See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 12
(explaining the philosophical and theoretical reasons for punishment).
191 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 14-15 (describing the theories of
utilitarian punishment and the criticisms surrounding them).
192 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 10.
193 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 15.
194 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 13.
195 DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 10.
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educate criminals. 196 This is the kind of punishment needed for
juveniles convicted of murder in a criminal court. Trying minors as
adults and then giving them reduced sentences or sentencing them
to juvenile institutions defeats the purpose of criminal punish-
ment. 97 Criminal proceedings and criminal punishment go hand
in hand. 198 Without subjecting the juvenile delinquent to the
punishment worthy of the crime, the juvenile will not understand
how severe his actions truly were.' 99
196 See generally Drug Treatment: Less Help in Prison Will Boomerang,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 1999, at 10A (opining that educational
programs established to treat inmates will be cut if the budget is used to
accommodate an increase in prisoners); Richard P. Jones, State Leads Nation in
Housing Inmates at Out-of-State Sites Wisconsin Moves from Third to First Place
After Tripling Prisoner Relocations in 1988, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 6,
1998, at 1 (indicating that Wisconsin's prisons offer education programs and
drug-abuse and alcohol rehabilitation); Phil Kabler, First Female Warden
Surprised By Posting, CHARLESTON GAZE TE, Dec. 14, 1998, at IC (reporting
that Northern Correctional Center in Moundsville is the only state facility whose
medical and educational programs are accredited by the American Correctional
Association); Randy Ludlow, Prison to House Chronic DUIs, CINCINNATI POST,
Dec. 3, 1998, at IA (discussing a new innovative substance program being
instituted in Hamilton County, Ohio). See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2),
125.25, 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (setting the prison sentence for murder to a
minimum term of 15 years). The federal government sentences its worst
criminals to the ADX center in Florence, Colorado, which has the harshest and
strictest program in the nation. Michael Taylor, The Last Worst Place: The
Isolation at Colorado's ADX Prison is Brutal Beyond Compare, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 28, 1998, at A3. ADX keeps its inmates in cells 23 hours a day (even
during meals) for the first year and eventually inmates are allowed to socialize.
Id. This kind of prison is known as the "supermax" prison and is becoming the
nationwide trend to deal with dangerous prisoners. Id. Currently, there are 36
states that have supermax prisons. Id.
197 Aron & Hurley, supra note 30, at 12 ("[T]he call for juvenile offenders
to be treated as adult offenders is because society believes this is the only forum
capable of meting out punishment harsh enough to address the severity of the
crimes committed.").
198 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 30, at 12 (stating that transfer occurs
because of the want for harsher punishment).
199 See Kamenstein, supra note 13, at 2111 (stating that the juvenile is led
to believe that the leniency in punishment is due in part to the fact that his
behavior was not the product of his doing, but caused by an illness beyond his
control).
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C. Separate Prison Accommodations for Juveniles
For juveniles tried and convicted in the criminal courts, three
different types of incarceration are available: straight adult
incarceration, 2° graduated incarceration, °1 or segregated incar-
ceration. °2 In straight adult incarceration, juveniles are placed in
adult prisons and subject to the same treatment and programs as
adult convicts.0 3 Graduated incarceration places the juveniles in
a separate institution from adults until they reach a specified age,
as dictated by statute.2° Upon reaching that age, the juveniles are
removed from the separate facility and placed into an adult
facility.2 5 The segregated system of incarceration isolates the
youthful offenders from older offenders by housing them in
separate facilities for the term of their stay.20 6 Juveniles under the
segregated system will never co-habitate with adult offenders, even
after they have reached the age of majority. 207
200 PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME 1, 25 (1996) (discussing the different types of punishment implemented
by the courts).
201 Id. (referring to the various sentencing structures the courts use).
202 Id. (describing the punishments of the courts).
203 Id. (citing national statistics on the number of youths being housed in
adult facilities as well as the states that use this sentencing structure). The
juveniles are intermingled with adults with very little differentiation between
them. Klein, supra note 8, at 404.
204 TORBET, supra note 200, at 25-27.
205 See TORBET, supra note 200, at 25-27 (describing the procedures and
programs for juveniles in correctional facilities).
206 Klein, supra note 8, at 404. See also TORBET, supra note 200, at 25-28
(describing juvenile programming for correctional facilities and the states that
incorporate the segregated system).
207 See TORBET, supra note 200, at 25-27 (describing juvenile programming
for correctional facilities). The segregated system is similar to the juvenile
facilities used for sentencing juvenile delinquents in that the juveniles will only
be detained with other juveniles and never placed with adult criminals. TORBET,
supra note 200, at 25-27. However, the segregated system operates in the same
fashion as an adult prison except that there is more emphasis on retribution and
punishment rather than on rehabilitation. TORBET, supra note 200, at 25-27.
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The graduated system is the best form of incarceration because
juveniles are not threatened by adult convicts, assuring their safety
and, thus, allowing adult punishment for juvenile murderers. The
graduated system allows juveniles to be housed only with other
juveniles until adulthood, at which time they would be transferred
to an adult facility. Under the graduated system, the juvenile
delinquent is sentenced for a term of years in a separate facili-
ty.208 This facility is operated and managed the same way as the
adult facility but only houses juveniles. °9 Juveniles remain there
until they reach the majority age of eighteen.210 Once eighteen,
the generally accepted age of adulthood,211 the individual is
transferred to an adult facility.
212
Under the graduated system, no contact occurs between juvenile
convicts and adult convicts.21 3 Although the public's inclination
is to treat juvenile murderers as adults, the possibility of incarcera-
tion with hardened criminals tends to sway the public toward the
reformers' policy of special juvenile treatment.214 The public is
concerned with the possible abuse juveniles may encounter in adult
208 See Klein, supra note 8, at 404.
209 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at 568-570 (comparing adult and
juvenile institutions). The main difference between a juvenile facility and an
adult facility is that the juvenile detention centers have rehabilitation as their sole
and main focus while adult facilities (prisons) concentrate on retribution and
deterrence as well as rehabilitation. See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 8, at
568-70.
210 See TORBET, supra note 200, at 25 (describing the different procedures
for juvenile incarceration).
211 The definition of adult is "one who has attained the legal age of majority:
generally eighteen years." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1995).
212 See TORBET, supra note 200, at 25 (describing the procedures of juvenile
graduated incarceration).
213 See Klein, supra note 8, at 404 (discussing that juveniles would be kept
separate from adults until attaining the age of adulthood).
214 See Dunham, supra note 29, at 509 (explaining that the reform movement
started, in part, to keep juvenile offenders away from hardened adult criminals
so that further delinquent or criminal behavior would not ensue). See also supra
Part I.A, describing the rehabilitative approach to juvenile treatment as the best
approach to reforming youthful offenders into law-abiding citizens.
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persons.2"5 The thought of juvenile offenders being sexually and
physically abused by older inmates forces people to look disfavora-
bly at harsher measures for young murderers. The graduated system
relieves the public from worrying that juvenile convicts will be
abused or attacked by adult criminals. At the same time, the system
allows for the juvenile criminals to serve longer sentences because
the state does not have to construct a separate facility to hold the
juveniles after they reach the maximum age of detention permitted
in a juvenile institution.216 When juveniles reach majority, they
will be transferred to an adult prison to serve out the rest of their
sentences. 2 7 Thus, the graduated system is the best because it is
the safest for juveniles and appeases the public's concern over their
safety while allowing the public to remain convicted to treating
juvenile criminals as adults.
CONCLUSION
While our penal system acts to punish adults who commit
murder, there seems to be no compensatory consequences for
children who do the same. The former are subject to capital
punishment or long prison sentences, while the latter are subject to
215 See Klein, supra note 8, at 404-05 (citations omitted) (illustrating,
through statistics, the likelihood that the juvenile will be abused in prison).
Studies show that sexual and physical assault of juveniles is much
more likely in adult facilities. While 36.7% of juveniles in juvenile
facilities report being victims of violent attack[s], 45.7% of juveniles
in adult facilities report such abuse. In addition, sexual assault of a
juvenile is five times more likely in an adult facility than in a juvenile
one. Also, beatings by staff are nearly twice as likely for juveniles in
adult facilities than for those housed in juvenile facilities, and attacks
with weapons are nearly 50% more common.
Klein, supra note 8, at 404-405.
216 See, e.g., Bloodshed, supra note 6, at Al (reporting on the juvenile
court's sentencing of the Jonesboro boys). The boys, although adjudicated in the
juvenile system, would have been given a longer sentence, but because the state
does not have a facility to house those between the ages of 18 and 21, they could
only be held until the age of 18. Bloodshed, supra note 6, at Al.
217 See Klein, supra note 8, at 404 (describing the graduated incarceration
system of punishment).
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rehabilitative state control until they reach the majority age of
eighteen or twenty-one, with the exception of those minors who
may be transferred to criminal courts. Therefore, an injustice is
occurring and a modification of our approach to juvenile murderers
is required to address this injustice.
The common view is that juveniles are not mature or mentally
developed enough to receive adult-like responsibilities and, thus,
when charged with murder, should not face the same consequences
as adults.218 But, these juveniles are not as irresponsible and
irrational as they are purported to be.21 9 Minors as young as
twelve are capable of understanding their actions and the conse-
quences that result therefrom. 220 Legally, this rationalizing ability
allows for these young individuals to appreciate their actions.22'
Accordingly, juveniles of at least the age of twelve are blamewor-
thy and morally responsible for their crimes. Therefore, children
twelve years of age and older should be subject to criminal
liability.
Since those over twelve should be criminally responsible for
their actions, the legal system should not take measures to protect
them as if they are not responsible. Subjecting these juveniles to
the adult system for only the specific act of murder would not
violate the evolving standards of decency because of the violent
and abhorrent nature of the crime.22 2 Lately, due to the recent and
218 See Juvenile Court, supra note 52, at 911 (indicating the reason for
infancy defenses and juvenile systems is to reflect developmental differences
between adults and children).
219 See supra Part II.A, discussing Piaget's developmental model. See also
Walkover, supra note 125, at 533-44 (discussing the culpability of a child to
determine whether he or she is blameworthy).
220 See MCCONNELL & PHILIPCHALK, supra note 94, at 380 (stating that at
the age of 12, children are capable of logical thinking and, therefore, able to
rationally understand the consequences of their actions).
221 See DRESSLER, supra note 61, at 104 (stating that unless the individual
appreciates the end result of his actions, punishment would be useless because
one cannot be deterred from that which he does not know is wrong). Therefore,
if the juvenile can weigh the factors of doing an act and not doing an act, he
understands the end result of that act and can be punished. DRESSLER, supra note
61, at 104.
222 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 816, 823 (1988) (stating that
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numerous accounts of deaths at the hands of children, there has
been a public outcry for tougher sanctions for those that kill,
regardless of the age of the accused. Therefore, it is necessary for
state and federal governments to amend their statutes to mandate
that minors twelve years of age and older who kill be transferred
to criminal courts. Automatic waivers, not judicial or statutory
waivers, should be implemented because they prevent inconsisten-
cies by eliminating judicial discretion.
Primarily, the JDA must be amended to catalyze juvenile
reform towards harsher standards. According to Representative
Charles Canady, "the federal government ... play[s an important
role] in encouraging the states to develop more effective policies,
particularly to deal with violent children. '' 223 Federal enactment
of a statute that treats twelve-year-old murderers as adults would
act a catalyst and move the states toward adopting similarly strict
juvenile criminal statutes. Eventually, all states likely would adopt
a statute similar to that of the federal government as they did when
the JDA first was enacted and when the JDA was amended in 1974
and 1984.224
If America's goal is to decrease the frequency of murder, it
cannot ignore the fact that its children are part of the problem. We
must acknowledge that harsher procedures and heavier penalties are
required for juveniles who murder. We also must realize that
treating these individuals as if they are not at fault only perpetuates
the problem and does not solve it. It is time to tell all juveniles that
murder will not be tolerated by prosecuting them as adults to the
fullest extent of the law.
punishment will only be upheld if it does not violate the "evolving standards of
decency" of society or held to be "abhorrent to the conscience of the communi-
ty").
223 See Meet the Press, supra note 76 (quoting from a transcript of the
debate between the five house judiciary members on the question of how to deal
with juveniles who kill). The question on juvenile killers erupted from the recent
Jonesboro incident, where two boys caused the death of five people. See Bragg,
supra note 2, at Al.
224 See supra Parts L.A and I.C, discussing the history of the JDA and the
current status of juvenile statutes.
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